Discovery and Administrative Due Process: A Balance Between an Accused\u27s Right to Discovery and Administrative Efficiency by Friedman, Marilyn J.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 8
Number 3 Spring 1981 Article 8
1-1-1981
Discovery and Administrative Due Process: A
Balance Between an Accused's Right to Discovery
and Administrative Efficiency
Marilyn J. Friedman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marilyn J. Friedman, Discovery and Administrative Due Process: A Balance Between an Accused's Right to Discovery and Administrative
Efficiency, 8 Hastings Const. L.Q. 645 (1981).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol8/iss3/8
Discovery and Administrative
Due Process: A Balance Between
an Accused's Right to Discovery
and Administrative Efficiency
By Marilyn J. Friedman*
A large percentage of licensed professionals in California are
regulated by state administrative agencies, which monitor profes-
sional conduct through the granting, suspension and revocation of
license's. 1 In recent years, these state agencies have wielded ever-
increasing power over certain professional groups.2 An attorney
who must defend against the revocation of his client's license
before a state agency is at a great disadvantage in that the tools of
discovery, which are readily available to a civil litigant, are of lim-
ited use to an accused facing disciplinary proceedings.3 The state
* B.A., 1977, Emory University;, member, third year class.
1. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11501(b) (West 1980) for a list of state agencies governed by
California's Administrative Procedure Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11500-11528 (West 1980).
Among those professions specifically enumerated are accountants, architects, barbers, be-
lavioral scientists, chiropractors, dentists, teachers, community college professors, cosmetol-
ogists, engineers, doctors and surgeons, embalmers, geologists and geophysicists, landscape
architects, psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, optometrists, osteopaths, pharmacists, real
estate brokers, shorthand reporters and veterinarians.
2. The total number of complaints filed against California health care professionals
has more than doubled since the State Board of Medical Quality Assurance was formed in
1975 by the state legislature; official investigations of individual health care professionals
have risen by more than one-third, and disciplinary actions have multiplied as much as
eight-fold. The agency with a staff of 170 and a budget of about $8 million monitors and
licenses 14 different health professions, including physicians, acupuncturists, hearing spe-
cialists, physical therapists, physician's assistants, psychologists and speech pathologists.
See Perlman, State Cracking Down on Doctors, San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 11, 1979, at
5, col. 1.
3. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11507.5 (West 1980) states expressly that "[t]he provisions of
Section 11507.6 provide the exclusive right to and method of discovery as to any proceeding
governed by this chapter."
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11507.6 (West 1980) provides:
"After initiation of a proceeding in which a respondent or other party is entitled to a
hearing on the merits, a party, upon written request made to another party, prior to the
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agency, however, has broad investigatory powers at its disposal
through which it can secure complete information and prepare its
case before filing the accusation.4
hearing and within 30 days after service by the agency of the initial pleading or within 15
days after such service of an additional pleading, is entitled to (1) obtain the names and
addresses of witnesses to the extent known to the other party, including, but not limited to,
those intended to be called to testify at the hearing, and (2) inspect and make a copy of any
of the following in the possession or custody or under the control of the other party.
(a) A statement of a person, other than the respondent, named in the initial administra-
tive pleading, or in any additional pleading, when it is claimed that the act or omission of
the respondent as to such person is the basis for the administrative proceeding;
(b) A statement pertaining to the subject matter of the proceeding made by any party
to another party or person;
(c) Statements of witnesses then proposed to be called by the party and of other per-
sons having personal knowledge of the acts, omissions or events which are the basis for the
proceeding, not included in (a) or (b) above;
(d) All writings, including but not limited to reports of mental, physical and blood ex-
aminations and things which the party then proposes to offer in evidence;
(e) Any other writing or thing which is relevant and which would be admissible in
evidence;
(f) Investigative reports made by or on behalf of the agency or other party pertaining to
the subject matter of the proceeding, to the extent that such reports (1) contain the names
and addresses of witnesses or of persons having personal knowledge of the acts, omissions or
events which are the basis for the proceeding, or (2) reflect matters perceived by the investi-
gator in the course of his investigation, or (3) contain or include by attachment any state-
ment or writing described in (a) to (e), inclusive, or summary thereof.
For the purpose of this section, "statements" include written statements by the person,
signed or otherwise authenticated by him, stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other re-
cordings, or transcripts thereof, of oral statements by the person, and written reports or
summaries of such oral statements.
Nothing in this section shall authorize the inspection or copying of any writing or thing
which is privileged from disclosure by law or otherwise made confidential or protected as the
attorney's work product."
4. See generally CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11180-11190 (West 1980). The investigatory
power of the agencies has been liberally construed by the courts; see Brovelli v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 524, 527-29, 364 P.2d 462, 464-65, 15 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632-33 (1961). See
also CAL. Gov'T COD- § 11189 (West 1980) which provides:
"In any matter pending before him a department head may cause the deposi-
tion of persons residing within or without the State to be taken by causing a peti-
tion to be filed in the Superior Court in the County of Sacramento reciting the
nature of the matter pending, the name and residence of the person whose testi-
mony is desired, and asking that an order be made requiring him to appear and
testify before an officer named in the petition for that purpose. Upon the filing of
the petition the court may make an order requiring the person to appear and
testify in the manner prescribed by law for like depositions in civil actions in the
superior courts of this State. In the same manner the superior courts may compel
the attendance of persons as witnesses, the production of papers, books, accounts,
and documents, and may punish for contempt." (emphasis added).
A state agency thus has the power to subpoena both parties and non-parties to take
depositions. Typically, the accused and his records are subpoenaed during the investigatory
phase, and efforts are made to secure admissions and statements before the accused knows
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Numerous commentators have argued for the adoption of full
civil discovery powers by an accused in order to offset the state's
adjudicative advantage. 5 The state agency serves a combination of
functions in the disciplinary proceedings. It not only files the accu-
sation, but is a party to the proceedings, as well as being the ulti-
mate decisionmaker. In recognition of this imbalance favoring the
state, reciprocal discovery rules should be afforded the accused to
insure a fair hearing.' Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged that fundamental fairness may require no less.7
Over twelve years ago in Shively v. Stewart,s the California
Supreme Court set a national lead in expanding the prehearing
discovery powers of an accused in a professional disciplinary pro-
ceeding.' In Shively, the State Board of Medical Examiners
brought a disciplinary action to revoke the medical licenses of peti-
tioners, John P. Shively and Seymour Smith, for performing illegal
abortions. Pursuant to Government Code section 11510,10 the peti-
the full extent of the claims which will be made against him.
5. See Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies Should
Catch Up With the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies
Kept Pace with Modern Court-Developed Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12
AD. L. REv. 103 (1959-60); Comment, Discovery in State Administrative Adjudication, 56
CALIF. L. REv. 756 (1968); Comment, Discovery Prior to Administrative Adjudications-A
Statutory Proposal, 52 CALIF. L. Rsv. 823 (1964); Comment, Quasi-Judicial Administrative
Hearings: Is a Dual System of Discovery Necessary?, 7 U.S.F. L. REv. 306 (1973).
6. The Administrative Conference of the United States, recognizing a similar imbal-
ance in the federal administrative process, has recommended that each agency adopt certain
minimum discovery requirements, including depositions. See RECOMMENDATION No. 30, S.
Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1963), which recommends permitting each agency to
adopt discovery rules "to the extent and in the manner appropriate to its proceedings." See
also ADMINIStRATIVE CONFEIRENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1 RECOMMENDATIONS & REPs.
(1968-1970). RECOMMENDATION No. 21, id. at 37, lists the minimum discovery requirements
that Federal Administrative Agencies should adopt; see generally Tomlinson, Discovery in
Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89. Only a few federal agencies have followed the
Conference's proposals, with the majority of them still holding out.
In California, the assembly passed administrative discovery bills in 1963 and 1965
which provided for the use of both depositions and interrogatories, but they died in the
Senate Committee. See Comment, Discovery in State Administrative Adjudication, supra
note 5, at 756-58. It is clear that the agencies-both federal and state-are fighting every
inch of the way to retain their adjudicative advantage at the expense of the accused's right
to know all the facts behind the charges against him and to prepare an adequate defense.
7. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); for a thorough discussion of these cases see notes 44-53 and accompanying text infra.
8. 65 Cal. 2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966).
9. Id. at 479, 421 P.2d at 68, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
10. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11510 (West 1980) provides:
"(a) Before the hearing has commenced the agency, or the assigned hearing officer, shall
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum at the request of any party for attendance or
production of documents at the hearing. Compliance with the provisions of Section 1985 of
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESSSpring 1981]
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tioners requested the respondent hearing officer to issue four sub-
poenas duces tecum to secure prehearing depositions of the
Board's attorney and executive secretary and for the production of
documents. The petitioners' request was denied. On appeal, the
California Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Traynor, speak-
ing for a unanimous court, analogized between the position of a
professional facing disciplinary proceedings and that of a defen-
dant in a criminal trial: "[a] disciplinary proceeding [like a crimi-
nal trial] has a punitive character, for the agency can prohibit an
accused from practicing his profession."'" In view of this poten-
tially harsh outcome and the agency's multiple roles in the hearing
process, procedural safeguards in the form of deposition and dis-
covery rules were deemed necessary to enable the petitioners to
prepare an adequate defense and to promote a fair hearing.
The Shively decision followed a general trend in the California
courts establishing pretrial discovery as an integral part of both
the Code of Civil Procedure shall be a condition precedent to the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum. After the hearing has commenced the agency itself hearing a case or a hearing
officer sitting alone may isue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum.
(b) The process issued pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be extended to all parts of the
state and shall be served in accordance with the provisions of Sections 1987 and 1988 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. No witness shall be obliged to attend at a place out of the county
in which he resides unless the distance be less than 150 miles from his place of residence
except that the agency, upon affidavit of any party showing that the testimony of such wit-
ness is material and necessary, may endorse on the subpoena an order requiring the attend-
ance of such witness.
(c) All witnesses appearing pursuant to subpoena, other than the parties or officers or
employees of the State or any political subdivision thereof, shall receive fees, and all wit-
nesses appearing pursuant to subpoena, except the parties, shall receive mileage in the same
amount and under the same circumstances as prescribed by law for witnesses in civil actions
in a superior court. Witnesses appearing pursuant to subpoena, except the parties, who at-
tend hearings at points so far removed from their residences as to prohibit return thereto
from day to day shall be entitled in addition to fees and mileage to a per diem compensation
of three dollars ($3) for expenses of subsistence for each day of actual attendance and for
each day necessarily occupied in traveling to and from the hearing. Fees, mileage and ex-
penses of subsistence shall be paid by the party at whose request the witness is
subpoenaed."
Under former Government Code section 11510(a), the Shively Court held that the issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum was a ministerial act to which the agency or hearing officer
has no discretion, whether the subpoena was for the production of evidence at the hearing
or for prehearing discovery purposes. Thus the Shively holding allows an accused to invoke
the agency's subpoena power to secure prehearing depositions. However, the 1968 amend-
ment to CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11510 and the enactment of CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11507.5 and
11507.6 have limited the Shively ruling by eliminating the use of depositions and other
discovery tools by an accused.
11. 65 Cal. 2d at 480, 421 P.2d at 68, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 220. See Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 751-55, 781, 784 (1964).
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the civil and criminal judicial process.' 2 The rationale behind liber-
alizing discovery procedures was to enhance fairness by reducing
the possibility of surprise at trial. Through the use of discovery
procedures, the trial was to become less a game of blindman's bluff
and more a process of ascertaining the truth.'3
Two years after Shively, the California legislature enacted sec-
tions 11507.5 and 11507.6 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)14 which set forth the discovery rights of an accused in an
administrative disciplinary proceeding. The legislation severely
limited the Shively ruling by making the most useful discovery
tools-depositions, requests for admissions, examinations, inspec-
tions and interrogatories-unavailable to an accused. "5 Subsequent
case law has interpreted the statute to allow the use of written in-
terrogatories, but other discovery techniques are still not
available.' 6
The current state of administrative discovery is analogous to a
patchwork quilt, where some professional licensing agencies in fact
do grant the full panoply of civil discovery devices while most do
not.17 One such exception is Education Code section 44944, which
12. California has provided for liberal pretrial discovery since the 1957 enactment of
the discovery provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2036
(West 1955 & Supp. 1980). See also, the landmark decision of Greyhound Corp. v. Superior
Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 364 P.2d 266, 275, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 99 (1961), in which the court
construed those provisions broadly in light of the important policy considerations underly-
ing that legislative enactment. For a thorough analysis of the development of California's
criminal discovery, see Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 228 (1964).
13. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 944-46 (1961).
14. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11500-11528 (West 1980). See note 3 supra for the text of
sections 11507.5 and 11507.6.
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11511 (West 1980) provides for depositions for purposes of
perpetuating testimony if a witness will be unable to or cannot be compelled to attend the
hearing. This type of deposition must be distinguished from discovery depositions. See
notes 73-74 and accompanying text infra. See also Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 421
P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966), in which Chief Justice Traynor emphasized this distinc-
tion, in stating that Government Code section 11511 "provides for depositions, not for the
purpose of discovery, but to secure evidence for use at the hearing." 65 Cal. 2d at 479, 421
P.2d at 67, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
16. See Romero v. Hem, 276 Cal. App. 2d 787, 81 Cal. Rptr 281 (1969), in which the
court gave a liberal interpretation to the words "written request" to include interrogatories,
recognizing that "modern concepts of administrative adjudication" require the use of inter-
rogatories in conjunction with CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11507.6, even though such a discovery tool
was not specifically provided by statute.
17. California provides broader discovery rights than under the Administrative Proce-
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expressly provides that the scope of discovery is not limited to that
of the Administrative Procedure Act but is instead governed by
the Civil Discovery Act."" In Brotsky v. State Bar,19 the California
Supreme Court afforded attorneys the full scope of civil discovery
when subject to disciplinary proceedings on the premise that the
State Bar was but an arm of the court and not an administrative
agency in the ordinary sense of the phrase.20 The result is that at-
torneys and teachers benefit from the protection of full civil dis-
covery rights while most other professions subject to similar disci-
plinary proceedings do not.21
dure Act to several distinct classes. In 1972, California school teachers in the kindergarten
through twelfth grade programs obtained full discovery rights with regard to hearings under
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44944 (West 1978 & Supp. 1980). Two years later, this protection was
extended to junior college teachers and administrators pursuant to CAL. EDuc. CODE § 87675
(West 1978). These sections expressly indicate that discovery is not limited to that provided
for under the Administrative Procedure Act.
California civil service employees obtained their discovery rights in 1963 under CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 19574.1 (West 1980). The California Supreme Court has left it an open ques-
tion as to whether full civil discovery is available to these employees. See Nightingale v.
State Personnel Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 507, 518, 498 P.2d 1006, 1014, 102 Cal. Rptr. 758, 766 (1972).
Blind vendors holding licenses for sales kiosks in public buildings were benefitted with arbi-
tration discovery in 1977. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 19635 (West 1980). There is full civil
discovery as authorized by the arbitration discovery statute. CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 1283.05
(West 1972).
Under Government Code Section 68753, the Commission of Judicial Qualifications is
empowered with the discretion to order the taking of a deposition in a pending investigation
or formal proceeding. There is only a requirement of a "minimal showing of good cause" on
the part of the judge under investigation. See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifi-
cations, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
18. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44944 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
"(a) In the event a hearing is requested by the employee, the hearing shall be com-
menced within 60 days from the date of the employee's demand for a hearing. The hearing
shall be initiated, conducted, and a decision made in accordance with Chapter 5 (commenc-
ing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code; provided,
however, that the hearing date shall be established after consultation with the employee and
the governing board, or their representatives, and the Commission on Professional Compe-
tence shall have all the power granted to an agency therein, except that the right of discov-
ery of the parties shall not be limited to those matters set forth in Section 11507.6 of the
Government Code but shall include the rights and duties of any party in a civil action
brought in a superior court. In all cases, discovery shall be completed prior to seven calen-
dar days before the date upon which the hearing commences. If any continuance is granted
pursuant to Section 11524 of the Government Code, the time limitation for commencement
of the hearing as provided in this subdivision shall be extended for a period of time equal to
such continuance; provided, however, that such extension shall not include that period of
time attributable to an unlawful refusal by either party to allow the discovery provided for
in this section."(emphasis added).
19. 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962).
20. Id. at 300, 368 P.2d at 703, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
21. Although the focus of this note is on due process considerations of administrative
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This note will examine the constitutional aspects of prehear-
ing discovery in light of recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions involving procedural due process in quasi-judicial administra-
tive proceedings, particularly that of license revocation
proceedings. The criminal law analogy first presented in Shively
will be discussed and it will be suggested that administrative dis-,
covery should be broader than criminal discovery because of the
unique characteristics of the administrative process. Finally, the
statutory and case law since Shively will be analyzed and it will be
argued that the limited discovery provisions of California's Admin-
istrative Procedure Act deprive the accused in a license revocation
proceeding of due process of law.
I. Procedural Due Process
Initially, one of the obtacles to the imposition of due process
discovery rights, it is important to mention that this disparate treatment accorded profes-
sionals facing similar disciplinary proceedings raises a possible equal protection challenge
under both the state and federal constitutions. Traditional equal protection analysis consists
of a two-tier approach for reviewing state legislative classifications. Under the less intensive
standard of review, the classification scheme need only be rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose to be upheld as constitutional. This standard has been described as providing
"minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972). The stricter standard of review re-
quires that the classification be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. This "strict
scrutiny" standard is triggered when a fundamental right or a suspect classification is
involved.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the right to practice a profession is a
vested fundamental right and should be protected from untoward intrusion by the massive
apparatus of government. See Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234
(1971). Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has listed the right of an individual "to
engage in any of the common occupations of life" as one of several fundamental liberties.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Furthermore, the Court has noted that
where there is threat of governmental deprivation of an individual's life, liberty or property,
the individual's right to procedural fairness is deemed "fundamental" and deserving of
strict scrutiny. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 395 U.S. 377 (1969); see also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTTurtONAL LAW 418-19 (1978).
Once the strict scrutiny standard is invoked the state then has the burden to show that
a compelling interest exists to justify the disparate classification. Any conceivable state in-
terests of summary adjudication and administrative efficiency in limiting discovery powers
under California's Administrative Procedure Act are not compelling to justify the discrimi-
natory treatment of professional licensees with respect to their rights to prepare an ade-
quate defense and to effectively cross-examine adverse witnesses. Moreover, the statutory
restriction of discovery fails to serve the state's objectives of expediting the proceedings
since it may lead to unnecessary continuances of the hearing when surprise results from the
testimony of non-deposed key witnesses.
Spring 1981]
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requirements upon administrative licensing proceedings was the
"right-privilege" distinction.2 2 A license to practice a profession
was regarded as a privilege and not a vested right; therefore the
state could grant, condition or revoke a professional license with-
out complying with the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the right-privilege distinction has eroded
over the years2S and its demise means that state administrative
agencies are no longer immune from the procedural requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Greene v. McElroy,24 the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the right to pursue a chosen profession free from un-
reasonable governmental interference is within the concepts of
"liberty" and "property" protected by the due process clause.25 In
Greene, a government agency withdrew its security clearance of a
private defense company's employee, rendering him useless to the
employer. Discussing the lack of opportunity to confront and
cross-examine those whose accusations deprived the employee of
his livelihood, the Court stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our ju-
risprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seri-
ously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action
depends on the fact findings, the evidence used to prove the gov-
ernment's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has
an opportunity to show that it is untrue.2"
The Greene Court emphasized the right to procedural due process,
at least the right to confrontation and cross-examination, where
significant consequences are involved.
Exactly what process is due was first addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,27
which involved the termination of welfare benefits without a prior
hearing. The Goldberg Court, abandoning the right-privilege dis-
tinction, held that procedural due process requires notice and a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing before an individual can be
deprived of a vital interest.2 8 Justice Brennan, writing for the ma-
22. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HAsv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971);
but see Note, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction? A Critical Look at
Maker v. Roe and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1979).
23. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 22.
24. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
25. Id. See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
26. 360 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added).
27. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
28. Id. at 262.
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jority, applied a balancing test in determining that "[t]he extent to
which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is in-
fluenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss,' and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication. '" 2 Although the Court in Goldberg stated that the
hearing need not take the form of a full adjudication, it did hold
that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial was required. 0
The Court listed those procedural safeguards which "rudimentary
due process" required to insure a meaningful hearing: timely and
adequate notice, an opportunity to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, the right to retain counsel, and the right to an im-
partial decisionmaker.31 Additionally, the "balancing of interests"
approach taken in Goldberg became the accepted approach for de-
termining what procedure is due. 2
It was not until Morrissey v. Brewer 3 that the Supreme Court
further elaborated on the requirements of due process. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, applying Goldberg's "balancing of interests" analysis,
formulated a two-stage procedure for parole revocation hearings
which satisfied minimum due process. The parolee was first enti-
tled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest with
some provisions for live testimony. Then, a final revocation hearing
was to be held which would include the right to written notice, the
right to disclosure of evidence against him, and the right to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses among other rights."
The Morrissey Court recognized the important discovery func-
tion of the preliminary hearing as a means for gathering and pre-
29. Id. at 262-63 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 266.
31. Id. at 267-71. But note that recent Supreme Court decisions suggest a retreat from
the Goldberg-type hearing requirement, wherein a flexible due process standard has been
adopted to suit the particular needs of the administrative agency involved. See, e.g., Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)(student corporal punishment); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976)(social security disability benefits); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974)(federal civil service employees); but cf. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194,
539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1974)(limiting Arnett's holding in California); see generally
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
32. In the plurality opinion of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), six Justices
engaged in the "balancing of interests" test articulated in Goldberg to arrive at their differ-
ing results. See id. at 167-69 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result in part); id. at 193-96 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 217-26 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
33. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
34. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
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serving information while "fresh ... sources are available. '3 5
Moreover, the Court held that due process requires the state to
disclose its evidence to the accused. However, the precise extent to
which disclosure is compelled by the due process clause was not
elaborated on by the Court.8
Goldberg and Morrissey make clear that where important per-
sonal rights are at stake, due process requires that some form of
hearing be afforded an accused prior to the termination of those
rights. To insure a meaningful process, the right to a hearing must
include certain essential peripheral rights including, as indicated in
Morrissey, providing the accused with the means to gather and
preserve facts. The tools of discovery were designed primarily for
that purpose. Full discovery rights would provide an accused licen-
see a method of ascertaining the existence and location of evidence
to be used against him and would minimize the inherent advantage
of the state's investigative powers, thereby furthering the fairness
of the hearing.
II. The Criminal Law Analogy
A. The Scope of Criminal Discovery in the Federal
Courts
Although recent United States Supreme Court decisions have
not explicitly dealt with the issue of pretrial discovery, they have
implicitly acknowledged a criminal defendant's right to discovery
by imposing a duty on the state to disclose its evidence to the ac-
cused. In Clewis v. Texas,88 the Supreme Court stated in a foot-
note that, "in some circumstances, it may be a denial of due pro-
cess for a defendant to be refused any [pretrial] discovery of his
statements to the police."3 " Additionally, the Court has specifically
recognized a duty on the part of the prosecution to disclose excul-
patory evidence to a criminal defendant. In Brady v. Maryland,40
35. Id. at 485. In fact, the provision for live testimony at the preliminary hearing
where an accused has the opportunity to cross-examine the state's adverse witnesses is simi-
lar to the taking of a deposition by a civil litigant.
36. But see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where the failure of the prosecu-
tion to disclose exculpatory evidence to an accused in a criminal trial was held to be a denial
of due process, discussed in Part II, see notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra; see also
Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
37. See Berger, supra note 5, Kaufman, supra note 5.
38. 386 US. 707 (1967).
39. Id. at 712 n.8.
40. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that "the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." 1 Considerable disagreement remains as
to the exact nature of the prosecutor's duty to disclose.42 However,
lower courts have suggested that Brady establishes a constitutional
right to pretrial discovery, at least as to exculpatory evidence."3
While the specific scope of constitutionally mandated pretrial
discovery has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court, two recent
cases have made it clear that reciprocal discovery rights between
the criminal defendant and the state are required by due process.4 4
In Williams v. Florida,'45 the Supreme Court upheld Florida's no-
tice-of-alibi rule 6 as not violating the due process clause. The
Court's rationale for holding the rule free of due process infirmity
was that it was "carefully hedged with reciprocal duties requiring
state disclosure to the defendant [of the state's alibi rebuttal wit-
nesses].' 7 In noting Florida's overall liberal discovery rules on be--
half of the defendant,'48 the Court reflected that the adversary sys-
tem is:
not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in
that system, at least as far as "due process" is concerned, for the
41. Id. at 87; see also In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1971)(California's counterpart to Brady).
42. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
43. See United States v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1972). As a practical matter,
disclosure of exculpatory evidence may be of little effect at the time of trial given the great
likelihood of plea-bargaining at the pretrial stage.
44. Tardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
45. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
46. FLA. R. CiuM. P. § 1.200 requires a defendant, upon written demand by the prose-
cution, to give notice in advance of trial if the defendant intends to rely on an alibi, and to
disclose to the prosecution the place where defendant claims to have been and the names
and addresses of his alibi witnesses. The prosecution in turn must disclose to the defense
the names and addresses of the witnesses the state proposes to offer to rebut the alibi.
Failure to comply with this rule may result in the exclusion of defendant's alibi evidence at
trial, except for defendant's own testimony, or, with respect to the state, exclusion of the
rebuttal evidence. See 399 U.S. at 104.
47. 399 U.S. at 81.
48. FLA. R. Crum. P. § 3.220(d) allows depositions for discovery purposes by the defen-
dant of the state's adverse witnesses without the limitation that the witness be unable to
attend trial. See also Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The
Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. Rav. 437, 450 n.77 (1972). Besides
Florida, Vermont, Ohio and Texas provide for criminal discovery depositions.
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instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for
truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the
State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the
determinationi of guilt or innocence. 49
Following the Williams rule requiring reciprocity, the Su-
preme Court, in Wardius v. Oregon,50 invalidated an Oregon no-
tice-of-alibi statute51 because neither the statute nor other Oregon
law provided the defendant with sufficient reciprocal rights of dis-
covery to make criminal discovery the "two-way street" required
by due process. The Court found no "balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser."52 The Court also noted that "the State's
inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if there is
to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the de-
fendant's favor."53
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to set forth explicit
standards for pretrial discovery by a criminal defendant, its hold-
ings in Williams and Wardius indicate that at least reciprocal dis-
covery rights between the accused and the state are required to
satisfy due process. Thus, while the criminal defendant may not be
constitutionally entitled to examine all the state's evidence against
him, neither is the state entitled to discover the accused's defenses
without tipping its hand in return. One exception to the reciprocity
requirement is the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence to an accused. Any adjudicative advantage therefore falls on
the side of the accused.
49. 399 U.S. at 82; see also Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or
Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 292.
50. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
51.: OR. REv. STAT. § 135.875 provided:
"(1) If the defendant in a criminal action proposes to rely in any way on alibi evidence,
he shall, not less than five days before the trial of the cause, file and serve upon the district
attorney a written notice of his purpose to offer such evidence, which notice shall state
specifically the place or places where the defendant claims to have been at the time or times
of the alleged offense together with the name and residence or business address of each
witness upon whom the defendant intends to rely for alibi evidence. If the defendant fails to
file and serve such notice, he shall not be permitted to introduce alibi evidence at the trial
of the cause unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.
(2) As used in this section, 'alibi evidence' means evidence that the defendant in a
criminal action was, at the time of commission of the alleged offense, at a place other than
the place where such offense was committed." (renumbered in 1969 as § 135.455).
52. 412 U.S. at 474.
53. Id. at 475 n.9. When presented with a similar notice-of-alibi rule as Oregon's, the
California Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117
Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974), deferred to the legislature's rulemaking power to promulgate a notice-
of-alibi statute and thereby avoided deciding the complex and closely balanced questions of
state and federal constitutional law.
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B. The Scope of Criminal Discovery in California
In People v. Riser," the California Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant had the right to obtain, at trial, statements
made by a prosecution witness to the police. As Justice Traynor,
writing for the majority, stated:
Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept
confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the
state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence
that can throw light on issues in the case.... To deny flatly any
right of production on the ground that an imbalance would be
created between the advantages of prosecution and defense would
be to lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascer-
tainment of the facts.58
Riser reinforces "the fundamental proposition that [the accused] is
entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all rele-
vant and reasonably accessible information."56
The California Supreme Court has extended the Riser ration-
ale to permit pretrial discovery on behalf of the criminal defendant
when it would be in the interests of fundamental fairness to do
so. 57 Conversely, the California Supreme Court has also extended
the prosecution's right to pretrial discovery. In Jones v. Superior
CourtIs the defendant was required to reveal to the prosecution
the names of his witnesses on the ground that discovery proce-
dures should not be a "one-way street." 59 Furthermore, in Jones,
the discovery procedure was held not to violate the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination since "[iut simply requires peti-
tioner to disclose information that he will shortly reveal [at trial]
anyway."6 Although the court in Jones stated that pretrial discov-
ery was not constitutionally compelled by due process," it recog-
nized the possibility that a criminal defendant should be "permit-
54. 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930, overruled on other
grounds in People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
55. 47 Cal. 2d at 586, 305 P.2d at 13.
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. See Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959)(establishing the
right of an accused to pretrial inspection of statements made to the prosecution by third
persons); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957)(establishing the
right of an accused to discover his statements before trial); see generally Louisell, supra
note 12, at 78-80; see also Traynor, supra note 12, at 244-45.
58. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
59. Id. at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
60. Id. at 62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
61. Id. at 59, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
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ted discovery. . . when necessary to insure due process of law." 2
Indeed, the "two-way" street principle enunciated in Jones echoes
the due process requirement of reciprocity discussed by the United
States Supreme Court in Williams and Wardius.63
While recognizing a criminal defendant's due process right to
pretrial discovery of certain information,4 the California courts
have yet to recognize an accused's constitutional right to one of the
most useful discovery techniques-pretrial depositions.6 ' In People
v. Bowen,66 the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to depose the victim's four-year-old son on the
ground, among others, that a criminal defendant has no inherent
unqualified right to take depositions of prosecution witnesses prior
to trial.67
In a recent California Supreme Court case, People v. Munici-
pal Court (Runyan),e8 the majority reaffirmed that procedural due
process does not entitle a criminal defendant to depose prosecution
witnesses pretrial. In Runyan, the defendant, charged with drunk
driving and obstructing a police officer in the discharge of his duty,
sought to depose the officers involved. The municipal court
granted defendant's motion to take the deposition, but the su-
preme court reversed on the ground that the trial court had ex-
ceeded the limit of its inherent power to order discovery in crimi-
nal cases.69 The court held that Penal Code sections 1335 through
1345 operated to restrict the use of criminal depositions to those
cases where the prosecution witness would be unavailable at trial.7 0
The majority rejected defendant's procedural due process argu-
ment while noting that the defendant was not without sufficient
alternative means of getting pretrial discovery.1
62. Id.
63. See notes 44-53 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
65. The leading states in this area are Florida, Vermont, Ohio and Texas, which pro-
vide for discovery depositions by a criminal defendant. See Nakell, supra note 48, at 450
n.77.
66. 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1971).
67. Id. at 278-79, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. The Bowen Court did note, however, that,
under the circumstances, the trial judge should have issued a subpoena for the minor's ap-
pearance at an "in chambers" session where discovery could have been conducted under the
court's supervision. Id. at 281, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
68. 20 Cal. 3d 523, 574 P.2d 425, 143 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1978).
69. Id. at 528, 574 P.2d at 427, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
70. Id. at 528-30, 574 P.2d at 428-29, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 611-13.
71. Id. at 530-31, 574 P.2d at 429, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 612-14. The alternative means
considered by the Runyan Court included obtaining copies of the preliminary hearing or
grand jury transcripts, police reports, witness' statements, or by conducting voluntary inter-
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Chief Justice Bird wrote a strong dissent in Runyan, basing
her argument upon a fundamental distinction between two sepa-
rate kinds of depositions.7 8 The Chief Justice drew a distinction,
supported by legislative history, between depositions for the pur-
pose of perpetuating testimony for trial and depositions for the
purpose of pretrial discovery. She argued that the challenged con-
stitutional provision and statutes"' concerned testimony preserva-
tion and, that therefore, there was legislative silence as to discov-
ery depositions. 5 In light of the legislative silence, she argued,
Shively was thus applicable to Runyan and the trial court should
have been permitted to exercise its broad inherent powers to grant
discovery depositions .7  The Chief Justice left open the possibility
that, in a given case, pretrial discovery might be constitutionally
compelled by due process.7
The Runyan holding was seriously questioned in Hawkins v.
Superior Court.75 In Hawkins, the denial of an adversarial prelimi-
nary hearing to a criminal defendant indicted by a grand jury was
held to deprive the accused of equal protection of the laws. The
Hawkins Court cited with approval the United States Supreme
Court case of Coleman v. Alabama7 9 in which the preliminary
hearing was deemed a "critical stage" of the criminal process and
was recognized for its valuable discovery function. The Coleman
Court held .that the preliminary hearing serves not only as the ac-
cused's initial opportunity to be advised of the state's case against
him but it also permits a skilled defense counsel to interrogate
prosecution witnesses. It thus serves as a vital impeachment tool to
an accused in later cross-examination of the state's witnesses at
views of prosecution witnesses. But cf. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1181-82 (1960). According to Profes-
sor Goldstein, statements of government witnesses are no substitute for discovery deposition
procedures since the witnesses are not subject to cross-examination by defense counsel; also
the voluntary interviewing of government witnesses by the defendant is an unrealistic alter-
native, given the fact that "more often than not,. . . [witnesses] have been advised not to
discuss their testimony with [the defendant]. Without the subpoena, he can do nothing ef-
fective to break the wall of silence." Id. at 1182 (footnote omitted).
72. 20 Cal. 3d at 533, 574 P.2d at 430, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 533, 574 P.2d at 431, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
74. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 1335-1345 (West 1970).
75. 20 Cal. 3d at 538-43, 574 P.2d at 433-37, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 617-21.
76. Id. at 545, 574 P.2d at 438, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
77. Id. at 537 n.4, 574 P.2d at 433 n.4, 143 Cal. Rptr at 617 n.4.
78. 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
79. Id. at 588, 586 P.2d at 918, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970)).
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trial.8 0 Consequently, the two alternatives to discovery depositions
mentioned in Runyan, the grand jury transcript and the voluntary
interviewing of prosecution witnesses by the defendant, were
deemed by the Hawkins Court not to be adequate substitutes for
the adversarial preliminary hearing where an accused may conduct
probing cross-examination of the state's adverse witnesses. Absent
any subpoena power a criminal defendant has no other reasonable
means to compel the cooperation of hostile witnesses."1
Hawkins reflects a trend in the California courts towards ac-
knowledging the practical realities facing an accused in securing
pretrial discovery. A defendant indicted by way of a grand jury is
placed at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis an individual charged by
information. The use of the grand jury transcript does not provide
a method of discovery comparable to that of live cross-examination
at a preliminary hearing since the prosecutor, who alone conducts
the grand jury questioning, is not likely to develop facts which will
aid the defense. According to one scholar, the grand jury hearing
can be used as "a full-fledged deposition procedure for the prose-
cution without the embarrassing presence of defendant or his
counsel." '82 The grand jury is but a "captive of the prosecutor,"
thereby allowing him to "indict anybody . . . before any grand
jury." 3 Indeed, the grand jury has even been equated to an admin-
istrative agency of the prosecution."
The Hawkins Court considered the grand jury's dual role of
accuser and factfinder to be the main cause of its lack of indepen-
dence.85 In this respect the grand jury is analogous to an adminis-
trative agency with its multiple roles of accuser, factfinder and ul-
timate decisionmaker. The combination of functions found in
administrative agencies is thought to diminish greatly the objectiv-
ity of their final determinations and to increase the risk of
prejudice against the accused. It is, therefore, important to provide
an accused licensee with a full range of discovery tools prior to an
administrative hearing to offset the state's adjudicative advantage.
In light of the California Supreme Court's recognition of the
80. 22 Cal. 3d at 588, 586 P.2d at 918-19, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
81. Id. at 589, 586 P.2d at 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 438. See also Goldstein, supra note
71, at 1182.
82. Goldstein, supra note 71, at 1191.
83. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d at 590, 586 P.2d at 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. at
438 (citation omitted).
84. See Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative
Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N.M.L. Rnv. 141, 142 (1972).
85. 22 Cal. 3d at 591, 586 P.2d at 920, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
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fundamental right of a criminal defendant to secure pretrial infor-
mation through the preliminary hearing, whether he be indicted by
information or by grand jury, an accused licensee should be in-
sured equivalent procedural safeguards. The use of pretrial deposi-
tions in administrative proceedings would achieve discovery goals
similar to those of a preliminary hearing.8 6
C. Beyond the Scope of Criminal Discovery: The Need
for Broader Discovery Rights for an Accused in a Li-
cense Revocation Proceeding
In addition to the right to a preliminary hearing recognized in
California, the criminal defendant is protected by procedural safe-
guards not paralleled in administrative proceedings. The defen-
dant is presumed innocent until proven guilty,87 enjoys a privilege
against self-incrimination,88 and must be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.89
In contrast, a license revocation hearing generally affords the
licensee very few procedural safeguards.90 An administrative hear-
ing is not conducted according to the rules applicable to a full-
fledged trial. The rules of evidence are relaxed,91 and the state
must meet a lower standard of proof.92 Furthermore, unlike a crim-
86. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
87. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096 (West 1970).
88. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1324, 1324.1 (West 1970). The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is also guaranteed under the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and
the California Constitution, CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 15.
89. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096 (West 1970).
90. Notice and pleading requirements serve as the initial procedural safeguard by in-
forming an accused of the specific nature of the charges made against him. According to
Professor Davis, "[t]he most important characteristic of pleadings in the administrative pro-
cess is their unimportance." 1 K. DAvis, ADmimuTNmrAvn LAW TRAiTsE, § 8.04, at 523 (1958
& Supp. 1980). See also Kaufman, supra note 5, at 107. Judge Kaufman notes that the
underlying rationale for relaxing pleading requirements in the federal courts was the con-
comitant adoption of liberalized discovery procedures.
91. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1980) provides:
"(c) The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evi-
dence and witnesses. Any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on
which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless
of the existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper the ad-
mission of such evidence over objection in civil actions. Hearsay evidence may be used for
the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence but shall not be sufficient in
itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. The
rules of privilege shall be effective to the extent that they are otherwise required by statute
to be recognized at the hearing, and irrelevant and unduly repetitious evidence shall be
excluded."
92. See Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 940, 123 Cal.
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inal defendant, an accused licensee is not presumed innocent and
has no privilege against self-incrimination."
The accused in an administrative disciplinary proceeding may
be subject to punishment equal to or more severe than that to
which a criminal defendant is subject. License revocation proceed-
ings may permanently deprive a person of the livelihood for which
he or she has trained over a period of many years. Indeed, the rev-
ocation of a license may be even more stigmatizing than the impo-
sition of a criminal sentence or fine,4 and yet the accused licensee
is afforded less protection from unfair judicial process.
In determining the boundaries of due process the courts have
engaged in a balancing test, weighing the government's interest in
administrative efficiency against the importance of the private in-
terest to be protected.95 Certainly the gravity of the loss
threatened in license revocation hearings necessitates the imposi-
tion of maximum procedural safeguards.9 6
The main obstacle to the implementation of broad discovery
rights as part of the criminal process is the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment.9 7 Such a privilege is not present in the administrative pro-
cess;98 therefore, there is no constitutional impediment to adopting
broad discovery procedures. Moreover, the due process require-
ment of adequate notice and a fair hearing may even compel the
adoption of broader discovery procedures in order to balance the
forces between the accused licensee and the state.
Rptr. 563, 569 (1975).
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513(b) (West 1980) provides in pertinent part: "If respondent
does not testify in his own behalf he may be called and examined as if under cross-examina-
tion." See also Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 940, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 563, 569 (1975), in which the court refused to consider appellant's challenge of the
constitutional validity of this statute.
94. In Shively v. Stewart, Chief Justice Traynor noted that "[t]he criminal law anal-
ogy is appropriate [in license revocation proceedings]." 65 Cal. 2d at 479, 421 P.2d at 68, 55
Cal. Rptr. at 220. For an excellent discussion of the similarity between agency adjudication
and criminal proceedings see Comment, Discovery in State Administrative Adjudication,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 756, 776-78 (1968). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6087 (West Supp.
1980), requiring the disbarred attorney in state bar disciplinary cases to notify his clients of
his punishment which has a stigmatizing effect.
95. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Friendly, supra note 31 at 1297. In ranking various administrative proceedings
on a scale from those requiring greatest procedural safeguards to those necessitating mini-
mum protection, Judge Friendly places revocation of a license to practice a profession high
on the scale requiring maximum procedural safeguards.
97. See Traynor, supra note 12, at 228; see also Nakell, supra note 48, at 437.
98. See note 93 supra.
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A much touted excuse for administrative agencies to refuse
discovery of their records to an accused licensee is that the privi-
lege of confidentiality, which encourages the reporting of profes-
sional misconduct, will be lost. This argument does not withstand
scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska9
concluded that the state's interest in preserving the confidentiality
of a juvenile's criminal history must be subordinated to a defen-
dant's right to cross-examine a witness.100 California courts have,
in a number of recent cases, treated the confidentiality versus dis-
closure question as a balancing test, weighing the need for confi-
dentiality against the accused's need to be informed of the chargesagainst him and the evidence supporting or refuting the charges. In
each case the fundamental fairness of allowing the accused access
to records prevailed over the need for their confidentiality. 01
Lastly, the opportunity for judicial review of adverse adminis-
trative rulings pursuant to the administrative mandamus statute,
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5,102 is not a viable
solution to the lack of discovery at the administrative level. Al-
though the reviewing court may in the exercise of its independent
99. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
100. Id. at 319.
101. See County of Nevada v. Kinicki, 106 Cal. App. 3d 357, 165 Cal. Rptr. 57
(1980) (where AFDC records were made available during a paternity suit); Miller v. Superior
Court, 71 Cal. App. 3d 145, 149, 139 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1977)(where policy of confidential-
ity of tax return gave way to more important policy requiring child support).
102. The pertinent sections of CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDe § 1094.5 (West 1980) provide:
"(a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final
administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hear-
ing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determina-
tion of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer, the case shall be
heard by the court sitting without a jury. All or part of the record of the proceedings before
the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer may be filed with the petition, may be
filed with respondent's points and authorities or may be ordered to be filed by the court. If
the expense of preparing all or any part of the record has been borne by the prevailing
party, such expense shall be taxable as costs.
(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has
proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether
there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the re-
spondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not
supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.
(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in
which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence,
abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported
by the weight of the evidence; and in all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the
court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of
the whole record."
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judgment 0 3 admit additional evidence, such evidence is limited to
that which, "in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have
been produced or which was improperly excluded at the [adminis-
trative] hearing. 10 4 The scope of discovery upon judicial review is
even more restricted than at the initial administrative hearing. It
is, therefore, necessary to provide full discovery at the administra-
tive level.
III. State of the Law Since Shively
The Shively decision'05 represented a great leap forward in ad-
ministrative discovery by allowing the use of depositions for dis-
covery purposes, where no such provision existed under the then
existing California Administrative Procedure Act.10 The Shively
Court recognized that the use of discovery depositions was neces-
sary for the accused licensee to prepare an adequate defense and to
promote a fair hearing. However, subsequent statutory and case
law has severely limited the Shively holding.0 7
In Everett v. Gordon,05 a case decided after Shively but prior
to the enactment of Government Code sections 11507.5 and
11507.6, the California Court of Appeal held that licensed real es-
tate brokers, subject to disciplinary proceedings before the Real
Estate Commission, were not entitled to take the depositions of
103. See Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 811, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 865 (1976): "In reviewing revocation of a license by a state agency the court renders its
independent judgment on the basis of the administrative record plus such additional evi-
dence as may be [properly] admitted. . . ." Id. at 814, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
104. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (e) (West 1980) provides:
"(e) Where the court finds that there is relevant evidence which, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or which was improperly excluded at the
hearing before respondent, it may enter judgment as provided in subdivision (f) of this sec-
tion remanding the case to be reconsidered in the light of such evidence; or, in cases in
which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence,
the court may admit such evidence at the hearing on the writ without remanding the case."
105. For a discussion of the Shively decision see notes 8-11 and accompanying text
supra.
106. The California Administrative Procedure Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11500-11528
(West 1980) was silent as to prehearing discovery at the time of Shively. It was not until
1968, two years after Shively, that the California legislature enacted CAL. Gov'T CODE §§
11507.5 and 11507.6 which set forth the exclusive discovery devices available to an accused.
For the full text of those code sections see note 3 supra.
107. See Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 123 Cal. Rptr.
563 (1975); Stevenson v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 10 Cal. App. 3d 433, 88 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1970); Romero v. Hern, 276 Cal. App. 2d 787, 81 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1969); Everett v.
Gordon, 266 Cal. App. 2d 667, 72 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968).
108. 266 Cal. App. 2d 667, 72 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968).
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material witnesses for general discovery purposes. The intermedi-
ate court interpreted the Shively ruling to permit an accused, upon
a proper showing, to depose an executive employee of a public
agency for a limited purpose.10 9
The Everett Court based its decision on the criminal law anal-
ogy drawn in Shively, but reached a different result. Relying on
Clark v. Superior Court,1 0 the Everett Court found that under Pe-
nal Code sections 1335 through 1345, a criminal defendant had a
limited right to depose prosecution witnesses for evidentiary, but
not for discovery, purposes."" Therefore, absent the proper statu-
tory showing of the witnesses' unavailability, the prehearing depo-
sitions were not authorized.
The Everett decision represents a retreat from the general
trend in the California courts towards allowing discovery. More-
over, it stands as a blatant contradiction to the basic rationale of
Shively-that prehearing depositions safeguard the accused licen-
see's right to a fair hearing and enable the preparation of an ade-
quate defense.
In contrast to Everett, the later court of appeal case of Ro-
mero v. Hem"2 represents a logical extension of the Shively prin-
ciple. In Romero, a licensed farm labor contractor sought to compel
the Labor Commissioner to answer interrogatories. While the disci-
plinary proceeding was pending, sections 11507.5 and 11507.6 of
the Government Code" 8 were enacted setting forth the exclusive
methods of administrative discovery. Those sections did not specif-
ically provide for interrogatories but the court of appeal inter-
preted the words "written request" liberally to include
interrogatories." 4
However, this expansion of the Shively ruling was restricted
once again in Stevenson v. State Board of Medical Examiners.",
In Stevenson, a physician, charged with employing an unlicensed
assistant, petitioned the State Board of Medical Examiners to is-
sue subpoenas to depose witnesses for discovery purposes pursuant
to Government Code section 11511.116 The petitioner sought to de-
109. Id. at 672-73, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
110. 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1961).
111. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 671, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
112. 276 Cal. App. 2d 787, 81 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1969).
113. For the full text of CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11507.5 and 11507.6, see note 3 supra.
114. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 794, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
115. 10 Cal. App. 3d 433, 88 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1970).
116. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11511 (West 1980) provides:
"On verified petition of any party, an agency may order that the testimony of any mate-
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pose physicians in his area of practice. The court of appeal held:
that under Shively the Board's duty to issue subpoenas pursuant
to Government Code section 11511 was discretionary rather than
ministerial; that the depositions authorized by Shively were lim-
ited to questioning executive employees of an agency, not material
witnesses; that prehearing discovery in Shively was intended to be
limited to production of evidentiary material which a deponent
had in his possession or under his control; and, finally, that peti-
tioner failed to show the materiality of such depositions to the
agency.117
The Stevenson Court misinterpreted Shively as authorizing
only prehearing depositions of an agency's executive employees.
Actually, the only limitation imposed by the Shively Court upon
prehearing discovery is that it meet the good cause and materiality
standards of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.115 To enable the
petitioner to make such a showing, depositions of the Board's at-
torney and executive secretary were permitted in Shively. This,
however, does not indicate any intention by the Shively Court to
preclude deposing of material witnesses. Stevenson's interpretation
of such an intention contradicts the rationale underlying
Shively-that prehearing discovery should be available where nec-
essary to give an accused licensee the opportunity to prepare an
adequate defense. A material witness' testimony is often critical to
the agency's final determination. This is especially true in proceed-
ings involving the revocation of a physician's license where expert
medical testimony plays a decisive role in the final outcome.
Therefore, the opportunity to depose such witnesses prior to the
hearing is vital to effective impeachment.
rial witness residing within or without the State be taken by deposition in the manner pre-
scribed by law for depositions in civil actions. The petition shall set forth the nature of the
pending proceeding; the name and address of the witness whose testimony is desired; a
showing of the materiality of his testimony; a showing that the witness will be unable or can
not be compelled to attend; and shall request an order requiring the witness to appear and
testify before an officer named in the petition for that purpose. Where the witness resides
outside the State and where the agency has ordered the taking of his testimony by deposi-
tion, the agency shall obtain an order of court to that effect by filing a petition therefore in
the superior court in Sacramento County. The proceedings thereon shall be in accordance
with the provisions of Section 11189 of the Government Code."
117. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 439, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
118. "When the agency's subpoena power is invoked to secure discovery, the good
cause and materiality requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985 must be gov-
erned by discovery standards." Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 481, 421 P.2d at 69, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 221. Accordingly, the Shively Court allowed depositions to be taken of the Board's
attorney and executive secretary to determine whether "good cause" existed for the produc-
tion of other discoverable evidence.
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A more recent case limiting the Shively decision is Cooper v.
Board of Medical Examiners.11" In Cooper, a psychologist, subject
to disciplinary action for allegedly engaging in sexual intimacies
with three female patients and for illegally prescribing drugs, con-
tended that Government Code sections 11507.5 and 11507.6 consti-
tuted a denial of due process by limiting his opportunity to take
prehearing discovery depositions. The court of appeal summarily
rejected the constitutional attack on the statutes, stating only that
appellant had failed to present persuasive authority on this issue.
Citing Shively, Everett, Romero and Stevenson in support, the
court went on to note that, "appellant had no commonlaw right to
prehearing depositions." 120
Cooper's reliance on the Shively-line of cases is misplaced,
however, since the cited cases all affirm the basic principle first
enunciated by Chief Justice Traynor in Shively that, "the law de-
termining the adequacy of administrative hearings 'is mostly
judge-made law. .. ' and 'the standards are essentially the same
whether judges are giving content to due process, whether they are
giving meaning to inexplicit statutory provisions, or whether they
are developing a kind of common law.' ",121 Indeed, the Shively
Court deemed the authorization of depositions for discovery pur-
poses to be an appropriate exercise of the trial court's inherent
common law power.12
In examining the relevant case law since Shively, one finds
that, with the exception of Romero, subsequent court decisions
have erroneously interpreted Shively's holding. Notwithstanding
these decisions, Chief Justice Traynor's rationale for expanding the
scope of administrative discovery is still persuasive. As noted by
several authorities in the field, Shively's sound and progressive re-
sult can be viewed as a model which other federal and state admin-
istrative agencies should follow. 23 Thus, despite the legislative and
judicial attempts to limit its scope, Shively should remain the
foundation for broadening administrative discovery procedures
where necessary to insure fundamental fairness.
119. 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 123 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1975).
120. Id. at 945, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
121. 65 Cal. 2d at 479, 421 P.2d at 68, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (quoting I K. DAvis, ADMIN-
ISTRATrV LAW TREATISE, § 7.20, at 506 (1958)).
122. Id.
123. See B. SCHWARTZ, AmInMSTRATvz LAW, § 98, at 279 (1976); 1 K. DAviS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.04, at 523 (1958 & Supp. 1980).
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Conclusion
For the past fifty years, the trend in both civil and criminal
law has been to broaden the scope of pretrial discovery. In this
area, administrative law lags behind. The rights affected, however,
are as substantial. Professor Kenneth Davis, a leading authority in
administrative law, has stated that, "[p]robably no sound reason
can be given for failure to extend to administrative adjudications
the discovery procedures worked out for judicial proceedings.' u 4
Indeed, full discovery procedures may be constitutionally com-
pelled when the deprivation of a property interest is at stake, as in
the case of license revocation proceedings where the means to an
individual's livelihood is threatened.
In view of the broad investigatory powers of administrative
agencies and their combination of functions, the full range of dis-
covery devices is vital to counterbalance the state's adjudicative
advantage and to insure the accused licensee's right to a fair hear-
ing. Depositions are the most useful discovery tool to balance the
state's investigatory powers because depositions help ascertain the
existence and location of evidence, and shed some light on the gen-
eral contents of privileged material. They are also extremely useful
to impeach witnesses and to develop issues and defenses, especially
when a witness' perception or recollection is critical to the case. 1'2 5
Arguments against discovery-that it is expensive, will cause
delay, and promote harassment or intimidation of witnesses-do
not outweigh the arguments favoring discovery. Discovery mini-
mizes gamesmanship and surprise at trial, and helps identify and
narrow the issues, thereby expediting adjudication. Some commen-
tators have noted that, "[t]he arguments against discovery are, in
effect, the same arguments that have been made against the ad-
ministrative process itself-that men can abuse the rights given
them by law. The solution is not to deny those rights at all, but to
tailor the law so that the abuses will be minimized.' 126
Much emphasis has been placed on safeguarding an accused's
rights at the trial or hearing. However, the fact-gathering phase of
litigation is equally important, if not more important. Judge J.
Skelly Wright stated in United States v. Bryant27 that criminal
cases
124. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATV LAW TREATISE, § 8.15, at 589.
125. See Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DuKE L.J. 89, 103.
126. Comment, Discovery Prior to Administrative Adjudications-A Statutory Pro-
posal, 52 CALiF. L. REV. 823, 845 (1964).
127. 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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point up an anomaly of our criminal process: controlled by rules
of law protecting adversary rights and procedures at some stages,
the process at other stages is thoroughly unstructured. Beside the
carefully safeguarded fairness of the courtroom is a dark no-
man's-land of unreviewed bureaucratic and discretionary decision
making. Too often, what the process purports to secure in its for-
mal stages can be subverted or diluted in its more informal
stages.
12S
This is also true of the administrative process, yet the accused II-
censee is afforded less procedural protection than a criminal
defendant.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the "right
to practice one's profession is sufficiently precious to surround it
with a panoply of legal protection. ' 12 9 Full discovery rights should
thus be available to all professional licensees facing administrative
disciplinary proceedings.
128. Id. at 644.
129. Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 75, 435 P.2d 553, 559, 64
Cal. Rptr. 785, 791 (1968).
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